This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance on financial development and stability, broadly defined to include the level of banking activity and the stability of the banking sector. We use a unique dataset capturing a variety of deposit insurance features across countries, such as coverage, premium structure, etc., and synthesize available information by means of principal component indices. This paper specifically addresses sample selection concerns by estimating a generalized Tobit model both via maximum likelihood and the Heckman two-step method. The empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that employ an agency framework. The basic moral hazard problem is the incentive for depository institutions to engage in excessively high-risk activities, relative to socially optimal outcomes, in order to increase the option value of their deposit insurance guarantee. The overall empirical evidence is consistent with the likelihood that generous government-funded deposit insurance might have a negative impact on financial development and growth in the long run, except in countries where the rule of law is well established and bank supervisors are granted sufficient discretion and independence from legal reprisals. Insurance premium requirements on member banks, even when risk-adjusted, are instead found to have little effect in restraining banks' risk-taking behavior.
they expect to achieve? We conduct an empirical analysis to examine the effect of deposit insurance on the size and volatility of the banking sector. Governments in advanced economies and many developing economies grant explicit 1 deposit insurance in the hope of reducing the risk of systemic failure. 2 In other words, the introduction of deposit insurance is presumed to stabilize the financial system by forestalling hasty fire-sale losses on assets that could bring down other banks and disrupt financial markets and the payments system. Moreover, by bolstering depositors' faith in the stability of the system, deposit insurance may lead to a deeper financial system, which could contribute to higher economic growth rates. 3 However, we argue that deposit insurance can be socially counterproductive if the system is not appropriately structured. Under many deposit insurance schemes, if a depository institution, such as a savings and loan firm, goes bankrupt, the government absorbs all (or nearly all) of the depositors' losses. This weakens market discipline (i.e., monitoring of bank activities by depositors and other bank stakeholders) and creates a moral hazard problem, since there is now an incentive for depository institutions to engage in excessively high-risk activities, relative to socially optimal outcomes. Especially in lax regulatory environments, these incentives are likely to lead to greater systemic instability.
The central issue that we address is the impact of deposit insurance programs on financial stability and financial development. The stability question is complementary to existing papers, particularly a recent study by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) . Based on evidence for 61 countries between 1980 , DemirgucKunt and Detragiache (2000 find that variations in coverage, funding or management of deposit insurance schemes are significant determinants of the likelihood of banking crisis, especially across countries where interest rates have been deregulated and the overall institutional framework is weak. We focus on the impact of explicit deposit insurance on financial stability and development over a longer horizon, and not only when a financial or banking system collapses into a crisis. Accordingly, our empirics are not based on crisis data alone.
In short, we focus on the steady-state, forward-looking effects of deposit insurance. Recent events have shown that in times of crises, no matter whether deposit insurance is implicit or explicit, depositors tend to be bailed out anyway when systemic problems arise. 4 Ex ante bail-out expectations, however, do influence bank risk-taking behavior even in stable circumstances, by truncating the negative tail of the distribution of returns, and our empirical tests are designed to measure these effects.
Moreover, our paper extends the empirical analysis of deposit insurance schemes in a couple of ways. First, we directly address the sample selection problems inherent 1. By explicit deposit insurance we mean a formal detailed system enacted by law as opposed to an implicit unwritten agreement between governments and banks.
2. By systemic failure we mean the simultaneous collapse of sizable portions of the banking system possibly extending to the non-bank financial sector as well as to financial markets.
3. See Levine (1997) on the links between financial depth and economic growth. 4 . See data in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001c) .
in analyzing the effects of deposit insurance programs. The sample of countries that adopt explicit deposit insurance is clearly not random, and thus we employ statistical techniques that account for this selection process (Hovakimian, Kane, and Leaven [2003] employ similar techniques). This approach will also allow us to overcome the difficulty in categorizing variations in coverage or funding within the heterogeneous spectrum of countries lacking an official insurance arrangement. Further, the same explicit deposit insurance program will probably have different effects depending on the general institutional environment. For example, a recent article by Gropp and Vesala (2001) argues that in Europe, implicit insurance has meant an even higher potential for moral hazard than explicit systems. This is because, though it introduces some uncertainty of being bailed out, the coverage of implicit insurance may extend to a larger set of bank stakeholders compared to the case of explicit laws protecting depositors alone. In less developed countries, this might not hold; lacking the institutional development to make limits binding, explicit deposit insurance might offer no benefits over implicit. We test, therefore, whether the effects of explicit deposit insurance are dependent on proxies for the quality of banking regulation and supervision.
Second, we attempt to summarize the features of explicit deposit insurance as completely as possible, rather than test the effects of individual program features or a subset of features. When considering the safety of their deposits, it is unlikely that depositors consider only one feature of a deposit insurance scheme but rather all the features together (coverage limits, types of deposits covered, and the credibility of the insurer). Similarly, when choosing whether to participate in a deposit insurance program, banks are likely to consider not only their premium payments, but also whether and how future payments will be adjusted to reflect portfolio risk and when those payments will be collected. We analyze deposit insurance programs based primarily on two sets of features: (1) insurance features reflecting the generosity of coverage to depositors, and (2) the requirements imposed upon member banks (which we call entry hurdles). We then test whether indices based on these two sets of features lead to higher levels of banking activity, and whether any such banking sector growth comes at a price in terms of higher financial instability in the long run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a motivation for the study using some stylized facts about deposit insurance programs. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework of how deposit insurance affects the level and volatility of banking development. A simple model of optimal portfolio selection is presented to illustrate how the introduction of insured deposits affects the optimal risk-taking behavior of banks. Section 3 spells out the main testable hypotheses we draw from our theory. Section 4 presents our results, Section 5 illustrates some robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.
MOTIVATION: STYLIZED FACTS
We rely on a cross-country database of deposit insurance features compiled by researchers at the World Bank. That database is described in detail in DemirgucKunt and Sobaci (2001) . We recognize the fact that those data, although clearly the best available, may carry some limitations. In particular, the published guidelines of a deposit insurance scheme may not always be followed when crises occurs. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001c) find that 27% of countries with deposit insurance coverage limits have actually exceeded them during some crisis event.
While it does introduce non-negligible measurement error, this need not affect the central results of our analysis. As mentioned earlier, unlike the previous literature, we do not focus on crises events alone, but rather analyze the long-term risk-taking incentives stemming from different deposit insurance schemes. In other words, we believe that the existence of official coverage limits (which have never been actually exceeded in 73% of countries) influences banks' ex ante bail-out expectations and consequently their optimal risk choices. Furthermore, it can be argued that, even in those countries where official coverage limits have been exceeded at some point in time, not all banks might have equally benefited from the exceptional bailouts, and in general the expectation of unlimited coverage repeating itself in the future might not at all be warranted.
Thus, in conducting this analysis, our basic assumption is that the published features of deposit insurance schemes reflect reality enough to permit meaningful cross-country comparisons. In addition, we synthesize the information from this database in a few principal component indices, so as to minimize the amount of measurement error (that might be attached to specific individual features) or countryspecific inconsistencies entering our regressions. Table 1 presents design features of deposit insurance categorized as reflecting either generosity or entry hurdles. By generosity, we mean those features that determine how much compensation a depositor expects to receive in the event that his/her bank fails. This group also contains features that determine the credibility of that compensation. Entry hurdles are the requirements imposed on banks in order to become a member of a deposit insurance program.
The six variables grouped under the heading generosity are (1) coverage per depositor, (2) a dummy indicating whether foreign currency deposits are covered, (3) a dummy indicating whether interbank deposits are covered, (4) a categorical variable indicating whether the source of the program's funding is banks, government, or joint, (5) a categorical variable indicating whether the program is managed officially (by government), privately, or jointly, and (6) a dummy indicating whether the program requires depositor co-insurance (a deductible). The entry hurdle variables (see Table 1 ) include (1) a dummy to indicate whether membership is compulsory, (2) a dummy to indicate whether funding is on an ex ante or on as needed basis, (3) the annual premium payment by member banks (expressed as a percentage of insured deposits), and (4) a dummy indicating whether the premium payments are risk-adjusted (for the member bank's asset portfolio).
The two variables associated with funding source and program management are less clearly identified as features of generosity towards insured depositors. It is reasonable to assume that governmental involvement in funding and managing a deposit insurance system may be perceived to enhance its solvency. The deposit insurer's ability to meet its claims is more credible if backed by the legal authority of governments, given their ultimate control of fiscal and economic policy. In other words, both variables may affect depositor perceptions of the credibility of the scheme. A scheme may advertise generous coverage, but that makes little difference for financial development if potential depositors do not find it credible. In that sense, these variables measure the credibility of generosity. In the empirical analysis that follows, however, the qualitative results remain largely unchanged when we drop these variables as measures of generosity.
"Entry hurdles" should be viewed as the characteristics of the deposit insurance scheme designed to avoid adverse selection problems or make member banks internalize the cost of the additional risk they bring to the system. For example, one way to make banks internalize the social costs of excessive risk-taking is to charge riskadjusted annual premiums, i.e., insurance premiums that increase with the overall risk of banks' portfolio. 5 Policymakers could conceivably achieve the same objectives regarding generosity or selectivity of member banks through different deposit insurance provisions. The design features, therefore, may be either substitutes or complements for one another. For example, a generous scheme may be one that grants high coverage per depositor, or one that covers a wider variety of deposits (including, perhaps, foreign currency or interbank deposits). A less generous scheme might impose co-insurance on depositors, which obligates them to pay a "deductible" before their coverage is activated. High entry hurdles could be achieved through high member premium, or through risk-adjusted premium payments. Programs that require ex ante funding might also impose higher costs on members than those that do not. Table 1 presents simple pairwise correlation coefficients for deposit insurance features for the 37 countries in our sample that adopted explicit deposit insurance schemes. 6 Those countries are listed in Appendix A. 7 The correlations among the generosity variables in Table 1 seldom achieve significance. Probably the most significant result is that privately managed systems appear in most cases to be also privately funded and have relatively limited coverage. In addition, as logic would predict, deposit insurance systems offering higher coverage levels also require higher premium payments from member banks. Moreover, it appears that in creating 5 . Although this holds in principle, our analysis will show how risk-adjusted premiums might in fact have only limited effects.
6. Variable means are also included in parentheses in the far left column of Table 1 . Throughout the analysis, implicit deposit insurance is simply defined as lack of an explicit scheme.
7. The latest version of the World Bank database on deposit insurance contains information for 178 countries, 68 of which have explicit insurance schemes. Of those 68, eight adopted deposit insurance in the 1960s or earlier. We lack sufficient IFS data for those countries to include them in the regressions. Ten others adopted deposit insurance in 1998 or 1999. Because their adoption was so recent, we lack sufficient IFS data for them to enter the regressions. For 13 other countries, there are missing data problems that do not stem from the timing of adoption. Five are transition countries. Of the remaining eight, most do not have information on one or more of the deposit insurance features that enter our indices of generosity and entry hurdles. This leaves us with 37 countries with complete data. The database can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/upcoming/deposit_insurance/dataset2.xls. More detailed description of the database is available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/ confs/upcoming/deposit_insurance/data.pdf.
higher entry hurdles, countries have tended to both increase premium payments and require that they be made risk-adjusted.
We also find a significant negative correlation between ex post funding and government management, which we believe can reasonably be explained in accordance with our underlying theoretical framework. In fact, allowing a deposit insurance system to be funded only ex post may reduce banks' incentives for prudent behavior. 8 In that case, a more stringent private management of the system can have a useful counterbalancing effect.
While it may be instructive to familiarize the reader with the data at the center of our analysis, a simple correlation analysis appears largely insufficient to shed light on how different deposit insurance features are related among themselves or as to how they might affect the risk-taking incentives of banks. In Section 2, we set out a conceptual foundation based on agency paradigms from the corporate finance literature. We then draw from the theory testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical analysis in the remainder of the paper focusing on the link between deposit insurance and financial development.
THE ROLE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN FINANCIAL STABILITY: AGENCY THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
We will characterize the potential investment distortion and resultant financial instability that could arise from an ill-designed deposit insurance scheme by appealing to agency paradigms in finance. The view that is widely held in finance is that the firm (say a bank) is a nexus of contracts among various parties or stakeholders, such as shareholders (bank owners), creditors (depositors), employees, and other stakeholders (regulators and tax payers). Left alone, each class of stakeholders pursues its own interest, which may be at the expense of other stakeholders. 9 Consider now just two classes of stakeholders: equityholders (bank owners) and debtholders (bank depositors). The debt contract may enable managers, working on behalf of owners (equityholders), to make investment and financing decisions suboptimally by departing from the principle of value maximization (optimal resource allocation). Riskier investments, if successful, will benefit equityholders, but they will reduce the value of collateralization to debtholders, if they fail. Thus, projects that are otherwise profitable may be foregone in exchange for high risk but inferior counterparts, leading to economic inefficiency. 8 . Consider the incentives facing a high-risk bank in a system funded only ex post. The bank will not be called upon to contribute to the fund unless a crisis occurs. But when a crisis occurs, there is a non-negligible probability for the high-risk bank to go bankrupt. In that event, once its net worth has dropped to zero, due to limited liability, there is no further room for any additional costs to the shareholders from having to contribute to the deposit insurance fund. In other words, a high-risk bank might reasonably expect that its ex post contribution to the fund will in fact never be paid. In this sense, the commitment to contribute to the deposit insurance fund only ex post might not be credible and could fail to effectively constrain banks' risk-shifting incentives.
9. See Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1985) for further discussion of agency issues.
Now we wish to pursue the agency analogy to bank deposits and deposit insurance. Consider first a bank that issues equity and makes investments in loans (e.g., commercial real estate). The bank faces a menu of investment opportunities characterized by rewards (loan profitability) and risks or volatilities (loan quality). In this case, the all-equity bank makes a risk choice that maximizes bank value (V*). However, from the standpoint of the society at large, all-equity banks may be suboptimal, if issuance of deposits enhances liquidity services. Consequently, the social value of banking considers the entire role of banks both as informed agents (asset side) and as liquidity providers (liability side).
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Thus, we focus on the economic consequences of deposit insurance by taking it as given that deposit insurance is already in place and that banks issue deposit liabilities, along with equity (bank capital). In the advanced economies and many developing countries, deposits issued by banks and thrift institutions are insured by the governments. Given the risk incentive problems that arise, abolishing deposit insurance may seem reasonable. However, in countries that lack formal deposit insurance schemes, including most African countries, deposits are implicitly insured even when they are not explicitly insured.
Consider partitioning of the payoffs to bank shareholders when deposit financing with a promised payment of F is outstanding. Given that bank asset cash flows are X, bank owners face a residual payoff of MAX (0, X Ϫ F), and the uninsured depositors and other creditors to the bank face the payoff of MIN (X, F). If deposits were fully insured, the insuring agency picks up the shortfall, MAX (0, F Ϫ X), so that the depositors end up with the full promised payment, F. Now the incentive effects of deposit insurance are analogous to private agency conflicts. The payoff to the bank owners is isomorphic to that of a call option and the government obligation is equivalent to a put option. When deposits are guaranteed, depositors themselves face no risk. However, risk due to the risk-increasing incentives of the banker is transferred to an insuring agency. For bank equityholders, the value of their option increases with both the value of future cash flows and the volatility of those flows:
where σ is the volatility of bank asset cash flows, and λ is a measure of the effectiveness of the deposit insurer's loss-control system. Since the option becomes more valuable as the volatility increases, the portfolio of bank assets that generates those flows is riskier than it otherwise might be. This creates incentives for bank owners to choose riskier asset portfolios. However, the risk effect is mitigated by the extent to which the deposit insurer puts into place a risk control mechanism.
We wish to draw some testable implications from the agency perspective of riskshifting on the relationship between deposit insurance and financial stability, as well as development. The analysis needs to be more structured so as to draw such 10. See John, John, and Senbet (1991) for a complete discussion of the social planner's objective function in the context of depository institutions.
implications. We use the framework of John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) to provide a reduced form characterization of bank investment incentives.
11 A representative depository institution (bank) has a representative portfolio of risky assets (loans). These investment opportunities can be characterized by their rewards (a schedule of means) and their risks (volatilities) of the terminal cash flows from the loan. The investment opportunity sets for two different banks 12 are shown in Figure 1 as concave production functions {(V(σ),σ),σ ε Ω}.
The value-maximizing level of risk for the investment opportunity i is σ * i ,i ϭ 1,2. For unimodal structures, such as V 1 and V 2 , there is a unique valuemaximizing level of risk, represented by σ * 1 and σ * 2 , respectively. In other words, the value-maximizing levels of risk differ for different portfolios of bank activities.
Central to the bank asset or lending risk incentive problem is imperfect observability by outsiders (depositors and regulators) of the asset or lending quality choices made by corporate insiders (bank managers). Given incomplete contracting regarding the risk choices, bank insiders (management) make investment and risk choices to maximize the value of the structure of their own claims, rather than maximizing the total value of the bank, V(σ).
Let us now consider that deposit financing, with promised payment F, is currently outstanding. For bank 1, for example, let σ 1 (F) be the risk level at which the value of bank equity, E(σ 1 ), is maximized. Bank equity can be viewed as a call 11. We bypass the details of mathematical derivations, since we can capture the essentials of the model through a graphic analysis. The more detailed derivations and proofs are available from the authors upon request. In addition, readers are directed to John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) for the general framework that is the basis for our stylized analysis.
12. Consider, for example, the differences between the investment schedules for money center banks and rural credit institutions. option, which increases in value as the volatility of bank assets increases. That means bank equity value is maximized along the value frontier on the right-hand side of V * 1 in Figure 1 . However, the risk incentive effect is limited by the concavity of the bank investment schedule, since the decline in V 1 adversely affects the value of equity and mitigates the pure volatility effect. A similar analysis would hold for the second bank depicted in Figure 1 as well.
Thus, with a sufficiently high level of debt (deposit financing), insiders or bank management (deciding on behalf of bank owners) depart from the first best risk outcome. In order to maximize the value of bank equity, bank management will invest up to an asset risk choice level of σ i (F) with i ϭ 1, 2, which is higher than the optimal σ The foregoing simple theoretical framework is sufficient to draw some testable implications that guide and motivate the empirics in the next section of the paper.
Financial instability and moral hazard (volatility effect):
In a poorly regulated environment, banks have an incentive to engage in investment (loan) activities, which are excessively risky, relative to the socially desirable level of risk;
With many such banks, the financial system becomes more unstable. Thus, with unresolved moral hazard, deposit insurance may be counterproductive, and it induces more, not less, stability in the financial system.
Economic inefficiency (value effect):
Not only do the incentive effects of deposits and deposit insurance lead to excessive risk-taking, they also distort bank investment activities (loans) away from the socially optimal level of investments. In essence, the existence of deposit insurance leads to a decline in the overall economic performance, as the overall bank values diminish in association with increased risk-taking and financial instability (note that Figure 1 ).
Capital regulation effect (entry hurdle and limited effectiveness):
Various reforms have been proposed to correct the distorted incentives facing bankers. Some proposals, such as risk-based deposit insurance premium and risk-based capital, attempt to replicate the incentives that would be provided by the market. Like risk-based premium, risk-based capital has some intuitive appeal as an entry hurdle. Theory predicts, however, that neither will be a completely satisfactory solution, but for different reasons, as discussed below. a. Capital regulation: The motivation for capital-based regulation should be clear from Figure 1 . The extent of risk undertaken beyond the optimal level,
, as well as the value lost due to risk-shifting, V
, are both functions of bank equity capital. With higher bank capital, (i.e., lower F), the incentive for risk-shifting is mitigated, so that σ(F) is lower. Looking at Figure 1 , for instance, additional capital infusion moves the bank back towards the efficient level of risk and investment value. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of capital regulation is limited, because: (1) although the incentives are improved with more infusion of bank capital, the distortions and excessive risks are never eliminated for deposit insurance which even minimally imposes risk on the insuring agency; and (2) given the variation in bank asset risk characteristics (portfolios), such as in Figure 1 , capital regulation would ideally need to be bank-specific. In this sense, standardized capital requirements are generally sub-optimal. b. Deposit insurance premium effect (time-inconsistency and ineffectiveness as entry hurdle): In our framework, the regulator can calculate a fair insurance premium by imputing the incentive-based risk choices induced by the level of bank capitalization (F) employed by the institution and the observable parameters of the bank asset investment schedule (see Figure 1 ; also consult John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000, for a formal derivation of an insurance premium). In other words, the government agency or private entity that offers deposit insurance might set risk-adjusted premia that account for risk incentives. However, this is time-inconsistent. Once such premia are paid, bank equityholders have no incentive to reduce the risk profile of their assets. To maximize the value of equity under limited liability, they will continue to hold the portfolio of risky assets that maximizes their expected upside benefits. The choice of bank assets may be completely divorced from the premia level. By broadening the pool of savings in the formal banking sector, explicit deposit insurance may, therefore, contribute to increased volatility, and risk-adjusted premia may be unable to prevent it. This may be what underlies the insignificant univariate relationships between riskadjusted premium payments and financial volatility (results not reported). We will investigate this more thoroughly in the multivariate tests that follow. 5. Optimal regulation and the rule of law: Our basic argument is that deposit insurance is distortionary and destabilizing in a poorly regulated environment. Capital regulation is one way to mitigate the problem, but its effectiveness is limited (see list item 3 above). However, there are growing attempts to come up with more efficient regulatory schemes. For instance, John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) argue that an efficient regulatory scheme can be achieved by exploiting the incentive features of bank management compensation, such as salary, bonus, and equity participation. In this framework, the deposit insurance premium is determined on the basis of not only capital rules but also incentive features of management compensation. The basic idea is that these features can be designed to make bank management sensitive to the interests of both depositors (and regulators) and bank owners. Of course, the environment, that fosters the rule of law and enforceability of contracts, facilitates the effectiveness of such an incentivized regulation. For instance, in an environment where regulators themselves have distorted incentives, the optimally designed banking regulation may not be implemented. In our empirical analysis, we control for optimal regulation through a number of indicators as described in the following section.
EMPIRICS

Generosity, Entry Hurdle, and Bank Supervision Indices
Our central predictions are centered around the effects of deposit insurance features on financial volatility and growth. The specific hypotheses are spelled out in Section 3.2 below. Here, we provide some background to motivate the choice of both the dependent and independent variables that will enter our regressions.
As proxies for financial volatility and growth, we use measures from both the asset and the liability side of bank balance sheets. In line with the literature in this area-for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and King and Levine (1993) -we use the ratio of liquid liabilities over GDP as an indicator of the overall size of the financial sector. From the asset side, following Levine and Zervos (1998) , we use the ratio of bank credit to the private sector over GDP as a measure of the development of financial intermediaries across countries, given banks' principal function in a market economy of channeling savings to private investors.
On the right-hand side of our regressions, we use a number of indices that capture the main features of deposit insurance systems across countries. In particular, we have synthesized the information contained in our database regarding the generosity and selectivity (entry hurdles) of deposit insurance systems into two main principal component indices.
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The exact statistical procedure used to derive the principal component indices is illustrated in the materials that accompany this paper on the journal's website. 15 Here, we would like to underscore the key conceptual and technical reasons for the use of principal component indices in our analysis.
First, the use of indices makes for a more direct correspondence between our regression variables and the theoretical concepts outlined above; this greatly facilitates the task of studying simple linear relationships between deposit insurance features and financial performance. Second, since there are multiple variables that enter the indices, it also makes it possible to formulate more flexible policy recommendations, allowing for tailor-made country-specific solutions. 16 Third, from an econometric perspective, since some design features are closely related (as they express different aspects of coverage, etc.), including principal component indices in the regression analysis represents a way to avoid, at the same time, potential problems both of multicollinearity (if we were to include all individual features in the same regression) and of omitted variable bias (in case we decided to omit some 14. See Section 1 for a more detailed description of both generosity and entry hurdle variables. 15. See (http://webmail.econ.ohio-state.edu/John/IndexDataArchive.php). 16. As explained in more detail on the JMCB website, each index may be interpreted as a linear combination of deposit insurance design features. As a consequence, the same score on a given index can be obtained with different combinations of deposit insurance features. This means that recommending (as this paper does) not exceeding critical levels in the generosity of the deposit insurance system does not translate into a one-size-fits-all recommendation of specific levels for coverage limits or specific arrangements regarding the system's funding, management, etc. In this framework, each country retains considerable degrees of freedom in designing individual features, based on its political, institutional and economic constraints, such that the overall score on the generosity index be kept below recommended critical levels.
arbitrarily due to our limited degrees of freedom). Finally, we employ principal component analysis rather than alternative techniques, such as factor analysis, because the resulting indices are simple linear combinations of the original design variables using "optimal" weights.
17 Therefore, regression results involving such indices can easily be translated in terms of a package of single design features, with the additional flexibility noted above.
One implication of this paper is that any adverse effects of deposit insurance may be mitigated by effective bank regulation and supervision. Even if depositors have little incentive to monitor their banks, sound supervision may limit some abuses and lead to healthier bank asset portfolios. Therefore, in addition to our own principal component indices described above, we borrow from the empirical literature in this area one standard index of the rule of law and three alternative indices of the quality of bank supervision.
The rule of law index is a six-point measure created by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 18 Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." While not a perfect indicator (the U.S., for example, which scores well on the index, did suffer the S&L crisis), the index has been used in the empirical financial literature for purposes similar to ours. Authors have used the index in growth regressions as a general measure of institutional development (Knack and Keefer 1995) and as a proxy for institutional development in the financial sector (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997).
19 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that explicit deposit insurance contributes to increased banking sector fragility in countries where institutional quality is poor. 20 Among the institutional indicators in their regressions, they note that the rule of law and the quality of the bureaucracy best explain variation 17. By contrast, in factor analysis, weights are obtained by minimizing the information lost in replacing a whole matrix of design features with one or more vectors that account for most of the variation in the original component variables. Those vectors do not correspond directly to any particular design feature. This makes it more difficult to provide specific policy advice regarding program design.
18. Legal tradition data are averaged over 1984-2001 for each of our countries. 19. More specifically, because the index is a good predictor of the use of long-term debt by large firms in their cross-country sample, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use it as an indicator of the ease with which firms can enter into long-term contracts. They point out that it is a better indicator of the quality of the contracting environment than specific differences in legal codes because firms may be able to compensate for the absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of contracts. La Porta et al. (1998) demonstrate that countries with legal codes that afford a relatively high level of protection for investors tend also to have stronger enforcement of laws as reflected in higher ICRG index scores. Our index, therefore, might be thought of as a summarizing both the quality of the regulations on the books and the quality of enforcement of those regulations. Finally, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) create a general measure of good government by computing the average value of three variables: our rule of law index and the ICRG indices for "risk of expropriation by the government" and for "the degree of corruption." They find that those countries that score well on their good government index tend to impose fewer regulatory restrictions on their banks and have less state ownership of the banking sector. While each of these studies illustrates a slightly different aspect of financial sector development that is captured by the rule of law, it is a proxy for the quality of regulation and supervision that has been widely used in the empirical financial literature.
20. One might be concerned that these proxies only imperfectly control for the quality of regulation and supervision. However, using a comprehensive cross-country database on the regulation and supervision of commercial banks, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) in the occurrence of banking crises. In the regressions that follow, therefore, we rely on the rule of law as one of our proxies for institutional development and effective bank supervision.
To capture specific aspects of the incentives and powers of bank supervisors, we rely on three variables from Levine (2001a, 2001c) , which draw on a new database of bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries. The first is a 14-point index of official supervisory powers. This index is based on 14 questions that ask whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. The second is an index of supervisory discretion based on four questions which ask whether authorities may engage in forbearance when confronted with violations of laws and regulations or other imprudent behavior. 21 Finally, we use a dummy variable that indicates whether supervisors are independent from legal reprisals from banks and other parties.
Hypotheses
Using simple interaction terms, the ICRG legal index and the three supervisory variables from Levine (2001a, 2001c) enable us to measure the effects of generosity and entry hurdles in weak versus strong regulatory environments. As laid out in Section 2, more generous deposit insurance schemes should increase F, the level of deposits outstanding, and σ, the riskiness of banking sector asset portfolios. We expect these effects to be reflected in increases in our two volatility measures. Again, however, the incentive to increase riskiness, and thus volatility, should be more effectively curtailed in sound regulatory and supervisory environments. These thoughts lead to our first two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Generous deposit insurance schemes lead to greater financial sector volatility. If so, the coefficient for "generosity" should be positive and significant in the volatility regressions.
Hypothesis 2: Any increased volatility due to relatively generous deposit insurance should be mitigated by a sound supervisory environment. If so, the coefficients for "generosity × supervision" should be negative and significant.
We also note that volatility is reduced only by effective supervision. While the rule of law is likely to be positively associated with effective supervision, the powers, discretion, and independence measured by the three variables from Levine (2001a, 2001c ) could result in effective or ineffective supervision. For example, the discretion to forbear on the part of supervisors could provide important flexibility in difficult situations, or it could be abused by authorities reluctant to impose discipline on poorly performing banks. Therefore, the interaction terms in our regressions should be viewed as joint tests of whether different types of supervisory arrangements can mitigate potentially adverse effects of explicit deposit insurance.
21. The questions for both the index of official supervisory powers and the index of supervisory discretion are available on the JMCB website (http://webmail.econ.ohio-state.edu/John/IndexDataArchive.php).
(Q7)
Hypotheses regarding entry hurdles are qualitatively similar to those for generosity, but they tie into the theory section slightly differently. In particular, one could view entry hurdles as a selection device that creates a roster of insured banks less prone to take on risky assets. In that sense, much like some forms of bank regulation or supervision, the entry hurdles could contribute to a less volatile financial sector. Indeed, risk-adjusted premium payments, a component of the entry hurdle index, may provide an incentive for banks with riskier asset portfolios to eschew insurance. On the other hand, because of the time inconsistency problem discussed in the theoretical section, even well-priced deposit insurance may have no impact on risk incentives. We leave it to our empirical tests to sort between these hypotheses.
For purposes of exposition, it is easier to invert our entry hurdle index (a "good" thing) into an index of weak selection criteria (a "bad" thing). In that way, predictions about the coefficients for generosity (also a "bad" thing) and its interaction with the legal index are now identical to those for poor selection. Our theory does not unambiguously resolve whether increased riskiness (σ) coincides with improvements or declines in V, the value of financial intermediation. Some volatility (riskiness) is probably necessary to create a vibrant financial sector capable of identifying new, relatively productive ventures. Too much volatility can be a sign of excessive risk-taking. Moreover, the dislocation associated with frequent systemic collapses is likely to lead to slower long-run financial development and economic growth. As proxies for V, we use the growth rates in our financial indicators described above. We view them as measures of long-run financial development. The mechanism by which generosity affects, first, the level of deposits, and, second, the riskiness of sector assets, and the value of financial intermediation, makes it the more natural channel through which deposit insurance could affect financial development, and thus our growth rates. The mechanism by which entry hurdles affect long-run financial development is less clear, at least in the context of the theory section, but we also test whether they, too, have an effect on growth rates. We expect that the potential positive effects of deposit insurance on financial sector growth are likely to be most pronounced in a sound regulatory and supervisory environment, one less prone to systemic collapse. Therefore, our final two hypotheses are as follows. We can formalize the six key hypotheses spelled out above with the following simple regression model:
where Y 1i is the growth rate of an indicator of financial development, or a measure of the volatility of that indicator in country i, G is the generosity of deposit insurance, H represents the weakness of the entry hurdles, or requirements, imposed by the deposit insurance program on member banks, Supervision is either the index of the quality of the rule of law or one of the three indices in Levine (2001a, 2001c) of bank supervision, M is a set of macroeconomic control variables that could also affect financial sector development and volatility, and R represents other potentially relevant aspects of the deposit insurance program or the banking sector. For the regressions in which financial volatility is the dependent variable, Hypothesis 1 (H 1 ) implies that β G1 Ͼ 0, H 2 implies β G2 Ͻ 0, H 3 implies β H1 Ͼ 0, and H 4 implies β H2 Ͻ 0. For the regressions in which the growth rate of an indicator of financial development is the dependent variable, H 5 implies that β G1 Ͻ 0 and β H1 Ͻ 0, while H 6 implies that β G2 Ͼ 0 and β H2 Ͼ 0.
Deposit insurance design features exhibit considerable variance across countries but, once in place, tend to remain fairly stable over time. We chose, therefore, to run a cross-section analysis (as opposed to a time-series or panel regression), as that allows us to capture most of the variability in our sample.
We computed long-run averages of Y 1 and M by aggregating data over all the years between 1960 and 2001 following each country's adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system. In other words, in order also to avoid reverse causation, we focus the analysis on how the adoption of specific deposit insurance features might impact subsequent growth and stability in the financial sector by altering the incentives of both borrowers and lenders.
The set of macroeconomic control variables in M includes inflation and real growth. High inflation, which may make some types of financial contracting more problematic, should have an adverse effect on financial growth rates. It could also increase banking sector volatility. Real growth should have a positive effect on growth rates, but a less clear effect on volatility. We also include the initial level of private sector credit to GDP or banking sector liabilities to GDP to control for convergence. In the financial development and growth literature, initial income per capita is used to control for convergence; its coefficient is negative and significant (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000) . We expect our measures of initial financial development to be negative in both the financial growth and the volatility regressions.
In the finance and growth literature, the dependent variable is economic growth and the explanatory variables include measures of financial development, inflation, and initial GDP per capita to control for convergence. Our regressions are similar, except that the growth variables and the financial development variables switch roles. That is, our dependent variable is growth (or volatility) of indicators of financial development and our explanatory variables include real growth, inflation, and initial financial development. These explanatory variables have also been used by other authors to test whether deposit insurance affects banking system stability, except that GDP per capita replaces the initial level of financial development (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002).
22 While these are our basic control variables, in Section 5 we include a number of additional variables in our regression equation.
RESULTS
OLS estimates for Equation (1) appear consistent with most of our predictions. 23 However, we cannot rely on least squares estimates, given the truncated nature of our deposit insurance dataset. Underlying common factors (income, legal tradition, past financial volatility, etc.) might be driving a non-random selection of the countries in our sample such that OLS estimates of Equation (1) might be biased. That is, they fail to extend to the whole population of countries with and without explicit deposit insurance.
Most of the previous empirical literature in this area tends to neglect this sample selection problem. We instead specifically address this issue by estimating a generalized Tobit sample selection model, 24 that allows us to endogenize the selection of the sample of countries that adopted explicit deposit insurance based on three key variables: prior financial sector volatility, ICRG rule of law, and per capita income. 25 We expect that strong legal tradition and general institutional development, as reflected in high per capita income, are positively associated with adoption of explicit deposit insurance, while prior volatility is negatively associated with adoption, as countries have been less apt to enact deposit insurance in turbulent periods. 26 Moreover, in order to show that our results are robust to multiple estimation techniques, 22 . Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) model the occurrence of crises and thus also include the terms of trade, short-term interest rates, and the availability of reserves as explanatory variables. Because we are modeling long-term financial development, those controls are not relevant. We note also that we do control for income per capita in the first stage of our regressions.
23. Full OLS results are available from the authors on request. 24. See Maddala (1983) or Amemiya (1985) for more details on generalized Tobit regression models for truncated data.
25. We also experimented with including a variable indicating whether a systemic banking crisis had occurred in the five years prior to adopting deposit insurance. That variable was never significant.
26. Like our other volatility measures, prior volatility is measured as the coefficient of variation in our two financial indicators. For countries that never adopted explicit deposit insurance, the prior volatility measure was calculated over the entire period 1960-2001 (although data availability implied that, in practice, most observations were calculated over a smaller subset of that period). For countries that adopted explicit deposit insurance, the prior volatility measure was calculated over the period just prior to adoption. Qualitative results are similar regardless of whether we use the three-year or the fiveyear interval just prior to adoption. Results for the three-year period appear below. we estimate the model using both Heckman's (1979) two-stage regression method and maximum likelihood.
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The results obtained with sample selection correction are shown in Tables 2 and  3 . Regardless of the dependent variable (the volatility of either private credit or liquid liabilities), almost all specifications in Table 2 provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The significant positive coefficient for generosity indicates that relatively generous deposit insurance schemes do coincide with greater subsequent financial sector volatility. The significant negative coefficient on the generosity/law interaction term indicates that the rule of law can mitigate the volatility associated with generous deposit insurance. These results are consistent with those found in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) , who find that countries with generous deposit insurance have a higher likelihood of suffering a major banking crisis, and that the rule of law can help mitigate the negative impact of deposit insurance on banking fragility.
Recall that the legal index is measured on a six-point scale. At the risk of reading too much into our model, the estimated coefficients imply that only countries with the highest scores on the legal index (five or six) can expect to experience no increase in financial volatility due to the generosity of their deposit insurance scheme. For example, the estimated coefficient for generosity in Table 2 , model 6 is 0.444, while coefficient on the generosity/law interaction term is Ϫ0.074. The net effect of generosity for a country scoring six on the legal index is, therefore, 0.444 Ϫ (0.074 × 6) ϭ 0. The model implies that all of the countries with average legal scores below six would experience an increase in volatility. Similar qualitative results apply for all of the models in Table 2 . None of the developing countries in our sample score six on the legal index; most score well below.
As it appears to be an important control variable, we include the share of banking assets in majority-state-controlled banks, which is negative and generally significant in models 5-12. In specifications 7-12, we add additional interaction terms between generosity of deposit insurance and the indices of bank supervision. 28 In specifications 7 and 8, the index of official supervisory powers interaction term is positive and nearly significant. Although the generosity variable loses significance in these two specifications, its coefficient remains positive, and this and the interaction term are jointly significant. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, official supervisory power is associated with increased sector volatility in countries that adopted generous deposit insurance. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) also find that official supervisory power does 27. An additional advantage of our sample selection approach is that estimating simultaneously the determinants of the decision to adopt an explicit deposit insurance system as well as its impact on financial sector volatility and growth helps to dismiss concerns of reverse causation or simultaneity bias. Overall, if it is well possible that the decision to adopt explicit deposit insurance (or none at all) may depend on financial performance, it is much less likely that specific deposit insurance features are designed conditional on these macro-indicators. Moreover, in a very similar setting, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) provide a series of instrumental variable tests refuting the hypothesis that the specific program features are endogenous.
28. When all four interaction terms enter the regression simultaneously, significance levels fall. This is likely because we have only 25-29 observations in the second-stage regression. 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) for PRIV and for LLIAB. They are intended to measure the volatility of financial sector development. There is one observation per country, and each is calculated as an average over all years after the adoption of deposit insurance for which data are available from 1960 to 2001. Heckman's two-stage selection model is estimated for columns labeled "Heckman."
The maximum likelihood selection model is estimated for columns labeled "ML." For Heckman models, z-statistics are in parentheses (t-statistics for ML models). We employ a two-stage estimation technique to correct for sample selection bias associated with the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. In the first stage, we estimate the selection equation. Explanatory variables include per capita income in 1995 as a proxy of general institutional development, and in some specifications "Law," a six-point measure of the quality of the rule of law averaged over 1984-2001 period (see Appendix B for further description). Higher values indicate greater adherence to the rule of law. The other first stage regressors are measures of past financial sector volatility, calculated over the three years prior to the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. For countries that retained implicit insurance, volatility is calculated over all years from 1960 to 2001. "Volatility PRIV" is the coefficient of variation for PRIV. "Volatility LLIAB" is the coefficient of variation for LLIAB. The second-stage estimation is conditional on the adoption of deposit insurance.
Regressors include "generosity" a principal components index derived from five deposit insurance program features-per-depositor coverage limits, coverage of interbank deposits, the program's funding source, its management type, and co-insurance requirements (deductibles). "Poor selection" is a principle components index of three program features that describe the requirements that are imposed upon member banks: ex ante funding requirements, premium levels, and requirements that premium be risk-adjusted for the assets held by the member bank. Program features are more fully described in the text and in the notes of Table 1 .
The exact methodology used to compute the principal component indices is described in detail in the material accompanying this paper on the JMCB website. "Law," which is used in interaction terms with deposit insurance variables in the second stage, is computed as described above. Three additional variables are used in interaction terms in the second stage: an index of supervisory powers, an index of supervisory discretion, and a dummy variable indicating whether supervisors are independent from legal reprisal. These variables are described in greater detail in the Appendix B. Inflation and real growth are averaged over all years for which data are available from 1960 to 2001 (again, all years after the adoption of explicit deposit insurance). Concentration is computed in the same way. It measures the share of total banking sector assets held by the three largest banks in the country. "Years in place" is simply the number of years that explicit deposit insurance has been in place. "Initial PRIV" is the level of PRIV in the year that formal deposit insurance was adopted. "Initial LLIAB" is constructed in the same way. "% State-owned" is the percentage of banking sector assets held by majority-state-controlled banks. *Indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level; **indicates significance at the 1% level. Pre-1996
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(10) LLIAB is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. The dependent variables are growth rates for PRIV and for LLIAB. They are intended to measure the rate of financial sector development. There is one observation per country, and growth rates are calculated as an average over all years after the adoption of deposit insurance for which data are available from 1960 to 2001. Heckman's two-stage selection model is estimated for columns labeled "Heckman." The maximum likelihood selection model is estimated for columns labeled "ML." For Heckman models, z-statistics are in parentheses (t-statistics for ML models). We employ a two-stage estimation technique to correct for sample selection bias associated with the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. In the first stage, we estimate the selection equation. Explanatory variables include per capita income in 1995 as a proxy of general institutional development, and in some specifications "Law," a six-point measure of the quality of the rule of law averaged over 1984-2001 period (see data appendix for further description). Higher values indicate greater adherence to the rule of law. The other first stage regressors are measures of past financial sector volatility, calculated over the three years prior to the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. For countries that retained implicit insurance volatility is calculated over all years from 1960 to 2001. "Volatility PRIV" is the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) for PRIV. "Volatility LLIAB" is the coefficient of variation for LLIAB. The second-stage estimation is conditional on the adoption of deposit insurance. Regressors include "generosity" a principal components index derived from five deposit insurance program features-per-depositor coverage limits, coverage of interbank deposits, the program's funding source, its management type, and co-insurance requirements (deductibles). "Poor selection" is a principle components index of three program features that describe the requirements that are imposed upon member banks: ex ante funding requirements, premium levels, and requirements that premium be risk-adjusted for the assets held by the member bank. Program features are more fully described in the text and in the notes of Table 1 . The exact methodology used to compute the principal component indices is described in detail in the material accompanying this paper on the JMCB website. "Law," which is used in interaction terms with deposit insurance variables in the second stage, is computed as described above. Three additional variables are used in interaction terms in the second stage: an index of supervisory powers, an index of supervisory discretion, and a dummy variable indicating whether supervisors are independent from legal reprisal. These variables are described in greater detail in the material accompanying this paper on the JMCB website. Inflation and real growth are averaged over all years for which data are available from 1960 to 2001 (again, all years after the adoption of explicit deposit insurance). Concentration is computed in the same way. It measures the share of total banking sector assets held by the three largest banks in the country. "Years in place" is simply the number of years that explicit deposit insurance has been in place. "Initial PRIV" is the level of PRIV in the year that formal deposit insurance was adopted. "Initial LLIAB" is constructed in the same way. *Indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level; **indicates significance at the 1% level.
not mitigate the negative impact of generous deposit insurance on the likelihood of suffering a major crisis. The index of supervisory discretion is insignificant in models 9 and 10, and the index of supervisory independence is negative in models 11 and 12, but significant only in model 11, which employs Heckman's two-stage selection estimation procedure. Based on models 5-12, only the rule of law and supervisory independence from legal reprisal help mitigate the financial sector volatility associated with generous explicit deposit insurance. Barth, Caprio, and Levine, and others have argued that the rule of law is a measure of the security of property rights. Our results also indicate that among the countries where the value of deposits is uncertain because contracts are easily abrogated, the volatility of liquid liabilities to GDP is high in countries with generous deposit insurance (although the result is significant at only the 10% level in Table 2 , model 3). The value of bank assets is also uncertain in these environments, which likely implies a higher share of short-term credit, which must be repeatedly renegotiated. As a result, the combination of generous deposit insurance and uncertain property rights also implies greater volatility in the ratio of private sector credit to GDP.
The specifications in Table 2 provide little support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. Coefficients for the index of weak selection criteria and for the selection/law interaction term are never of the hypothesized signs, and are insignificant in most specifications. This indicates that the entry hurdles imposed on member banks have little effect on subsequent volatility, regardless of the nature of supervision or the rule of law. Taken together, the generosity and the selection results imply that if a country adopts a generous deposit insurance program, it should not expect to curtail subsequent increases in financial volatility through careful selection of member banks. The rule of law and supervisory independence from legal reprisal may help limit volatility associated with deposit insurance, but the specific rules governing which banks have access to insured deposits appear to play no role. Again, the ineffectiveness of entry hurdles, especially risk-adjusted premium payments, may stem from time inconsistency problems discussed in Section 2.
The specifications in Table 3 help us assess whether the increased volatility associated with deposit insurance accelerates or retards long-run financial development. The negative significant coefficient for generosity provides some support for the "value effect" hypothesis spelled out in Section 2. An over-generous deposit insurance might distort savings and investment decisions contributing to slower financial development in the long run. The generally insignificant coefficients on the generosity/supervisory powers interaction term indicate that such powers do not mitigate this effect, nor does the rule of law (see models 3 and 4 in the robustness checks, Table 4 ). However, the positive significant coefficients on the generosity/ discretion and the generosity/independence interaction terms in models 3-8 indicate that some types of supervision may act as an adequate substitute for monitoring of banks by depositors. Note that in models 1 and 2, we include all countries that adopted deposit insurance from 1960 to 2000. Because many countries adopted 
(10) 
(10) a PRIV is the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP. The dependent variable is the growth rate for PRIV. It is intended to measure the rate of financial sector development. In models 11 and 12, the dependent variable is the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) for PRIV. It is intended to measure the volatility of financial sector development. For both types of dependent variables, there is one observation per country, and each observation is calculated over all years after the adoption of deposit insurance for which data are available from 1960-2001. Heckman's two-stage selection model is estimated for columns labeled "Heckman." The maximum likelihood selection model is estimated for columns labeled "ML." For Heckman models, z-statistics are in parentheses (t-statistics for ML models). We employ a twostage estimation technique to correct for sample selection bias associated with the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. In the first stage, we estimate the selection equation. Explanatory variables include per capita income in 1995 as a proxy of general institutional development, and in some specifications "Law," a six-point measure of the quality of the rule of law averaged over 1984-2001 (see Appendix B for further description).
Higher values indicate greater adherence to the rule of law. The other first stage regressors are measures of past financial sector volatility, calculated over the three years prior to the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. For countries that retained implicit insurance, volatility is calculated over all years from 1960 to 2001. "Volatility PRIV" is the coefficient of variation for PRIV. The second-stage estimation is conditional on the adoption of deposit insurance. Regressors include "generosity" a principal components index derived from five deposit insurance program features-per-depositor coverage limits, coverage of interbank deposits, the program's funding source, its management type, and co-insurance requirements (deductibles). "Poor selection" is a principle components index of three program features that describe the requirements that are imposed upon member banks: ex ante funding requirements, premium levels, and requirements that premium be risk-adjusted for the assets held by the member bank. Program features are more fully described in the text and in the notes of Table 1 . The exact methodology used to compute the principal component indices is described in detail in the material accompanying this paper on the JMCB website. "Law," which is used in interaction terms with deposit insurance variables in the second stage, is computed as described above. Three additional variables are used in interaction terms in the second stage: an index of supervisory powers, an index of supervisory discretion, and a dummy variable indicating whether supervisors are independent from legal reprisal. These variables are described in greater detail in the data appendix. Inflation and real growth are averaged over all years for which data are available from 1960-2001 (again, all years after the adoption of explicit deposit insurance). Concentration is computed in the same way. It measures the share of total banking sector assets held by the three largest banks in the country. "Years in place" is simply the number of years that explicit deposit insurance has been in place. "Initial PRIV" is the level of PRIV in the year that formal deposit insurance was adopted. "% State-owned" is the percentage of banking sector assets held by majority-state-controlled banks. *Indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level; **indicates significance at the 1% level.
deposit insurance only recently, their experience is probably too short to be statistically reliable. Therefore, in specifications 3-12, we include only those countries that adopted deposit insurance prior to 1996. Because the index of generosity enters models 3-8 in four ways (on its own and through three separate interaction terms), assessing its net effects on long-run financial development based solely on the estimated coefficients is difficult. Therefore, we illustrate our main results with a couple of examples. In many cases, countries that permit their supervisors greater discretion and afford them independence from legal reprisal, experience greater long-term financial development after introducing generous deposit insurance. If we set the explanatory variables (except for generosity of deposit insurance and the index of supervisory independence) equal to the median value for the sample of countries that adopted deposit insurance, the predicted private credit growth rate is 10.7% per year for the countries with full supervisory independence and the most generous deposit insurance. For those that do not afford supervisors independence from legal reprisal but have the most generous deposit insurance, the predicted growth rate is 2.2%, which is well below the predicted rate had explicit deposit insurance not been adopted (8.8%). If we set the explanatory variables equal to the 25th percentile of the sample of countries that adopted deposit insurance, the predicted growth rate for a country with no supervisory independence from the legislature and the most generous deposit insurance is -8.0%. With full supervisory independence, the predicted growth rate for that country is 0.2%. Both are well below the predicted rate without explicit deposit insurance (6.4%). With or without supervisory independence, the predicted private growth rate is declining in generosity for the country at the 25th percentile. This second example is probably more reflective of the situation faced by most developing countries.
Similar qualitative results apply for the index of supervisory discretion. For the median country that adopted deposit insurance, generosity has a positive net effect on long-run financial development if supervisors have wide discretion. With little or no discretion, generosity has a negative effect. For countries at the 25th percentile of the distribution, generosity tends to have a negative effect on long-run financial development, regardless of the level of supervisory discretion. For those countries, long-run development is almost always higher without explicit insurance. By drawing more savers into the formal financial system, generous deposit insurance can have a positive impact on financial development, but only if macroeconomic stability and the appropriate supervisory flexibility and autonomy are in place. Most developing countries do not provide such an environment.
In specifications 1-8, we control for poor selection of insured banks, which is negative but generally insignificant. In specifications 9-12, the generosity and poor selection variables switch roles-we control for generosity and we interact the poor selection variable with the supervisory indices. Although the index of poor selection is negative and significant in the private credit growth models (models 9 and 10), it is insignificant in the liquid liabilities growth models (models 11 and 12), and the selection/supervision interaction terms are insignificant in 11 of 12 possible cases. As in the volatility regressions, poor selection of member banks has much less effect on banking sector development than generosity. We note also that in models 9-12 the index of generosity is insignificant. 29 In conjunction with models 1-8, this once again indicates that generous deposit insurance cannot be associated with faster or slower financial development per se, but that the regulatory and legal environment in which it is adopted greatly matters.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We test whether the effects of the generosity of deposit insurance on financial development are robust to the inclusion of additional variables that describe the nature of bank ownership, market power, the age of the deposit insurance program, and the independent effects of supervisory variables. Because we have only 25-29 observations for financial development, we perform each test separately.
State Ownership of Banks
As noted, the percentage of total banking sector assets held by majority-state-owned banks is negative and often significant in the financial volatility regressions, and so we include it among the control variables. State ownership of banks is also negative and nearly significant in private credit growth specifications 1 and 2 (Table 4) . 30 In addition, state ownership is negatively, though insignificantly, associated with the probability that deposit insurance is adopted (results not reported). Our results on the generosity of deposit insurance and the supervisory interaction variables remain unchanged when we add state ownership of banks to either stage of the regressions.
Banking Sector Concentration
Market structure might also impact banking sector volatility and growth. We add the share of banking sector assets held by the three largest banks to our base private credit growth specifications in models 5 and 6 (Table 4) . Predictions regarding concentration are ambiguous. It may be associated with reduced volatility, but have a negative effect on growth rates, because a small number of dominant banks may be less inclined to hunt down new investment opportunities than would a higher number of less-established banks. Risk-taking on the part of less-established banks may, however, be so destabilizing as to retard long-term financial sector growth. In any event, in neither specification is our proxy for concentration significant, and 29. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) also find that generosity on its own is not significantly linked to the level of financial development.
30. In many African countries, a majority of banks' assets are in government bonds, which might be partially responsible for our results. That is, in those countries, there is a much greater propensity to channel deposits to the government rather than private endeavors. To the extent that state-owned banks are more likely to purchase government bonds than private banks, the negative coefficients on the state ownership variables in the volatility and the private credit growth regressions are reflective of this phenomenon. We tried to test this hypothesis directly by including in the regressions the share of deposit money banks' assets devoted to claims on local, state, and federal governments. We did not have enough observations (14) to provide meaningful results.
our main results regarding the generosity of deposit insurance are unchanged. The main results for the volatility regressions are also unchanged when we add the concentration measure (results not reported).
Age of Deposit Insurance Program
The number of years since adoption may be associated with both volatility and financial growth since it may take time before the effects of deposit insurance are evident. Therefore, we control for the age of the deposit insurance program in specifications 7 and 8 ( Table 4 ). In neither of those specifications is the "years in place" variable significantly associated with the growth rate of private sector credit. This could be because in those regressions, we include only countries that adopted deposit insurance prior to 1996, and thus sufficient time had elapsed for the program's effects to manifest themselves. Our results regarding generosity and the supervisory interaction terms are unaffected by the inclusion of age of the deposit insurance program.
Supervisory Variables
The three supervisory indices-for supervisory powers, discretion, and independence from legal reprisal-could impact financial volatility and development on their own, and not just through their interaction with deposit insurance features. To test this, we add these variables to our base models in specifications 9-12 (Table 4) . Because we have so few second-stage observations, this is a strong test of the robustness of our results. None of the indices are significant on their own in specifications 9 and 10, which use the private credit growth as the dependent variable. Using an instrumental variables approach, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) also find no significant link between the level of private sector credit to GDP and indices of supervisory power and discretion. With respect to supervisory independence, they find a positive significant association with private sector credit. Somewhat similarly, among the supervisory interactions with generosity of deposit insurance, only independence from legal reprisals is positive and significant in specifications and 9 and 10. Although the dependent variable and estimation method in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) differ from ours, we derive similar qualitative results regarding supervisory variables. Most importantly, adding the supervisory variables to our base specifications does not alter our main results-the generosity of deposit insurance is negatively and significantly associated with private sector credit growth and supervisory independence from legal reprisal appears to mitigate that effect. Supervisory discretion remains positive, but its coefficient just misses significance.
In specifications 11 and 12, we add the supervisory indices to our base volatility regressions. As in the private credit growth regressions, none of the indices are themselves significant. 31 Our main results are unaltered, except that the generosity/ law interaction term just misses significance in the maximum likelihood regression 31. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) also find no significant association between supervisory powers and the likelihood of banking crisis.
(specification 12). In the Heckman selection model, that variable remains negative and significant. In both specifications, the generosity of deposit insurance is positively and significantly linked to the volatility of private credit.
CONCLUSIONS
Although many countries in advanced and developing economies grant formal deposit insurance so as to reduce the risk of systemic failure of depository institutions, our knowledge of the impact of deposit insurance programs on financial development and stability is quite limited. This paper has provided empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance on banking sector development and stability. We use a unique dataset capturing a variety of deposit insurance features, such as coverage, entry hurdles, premium structure, etc. The empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that employ an agency framework. The basic moral hazard problem studied is the incentive for depository institutions to engage in excessively high-risk activities, relative to socially optimal outcomes, in order to increase the option value of their deposit insurance guarantee. Overall we find empirical evidence to be consistent with this theory. Generous government-funded deposit insurance tends to have a negative effect on financial development and growth except in countries where the rule of law is well established and both sufficient supervisory discretion and independence from legal reprisal are in place. Thus, the main conclusion of this paper is that the introduction of generous deposit insurance schemes in countries lacking adequate bank supervision and rule of law might not help but rather be an obstacle for financial system stability and development.
As far as "entry hurdles" are concerned, our results might appear to go against conventional wisdom. We find that entry hurdles, such as the insurance premium requirements on member banks, have little effect on subsequent financial development. These results can be explained in the context of our theory, which suggests that ex ante premia are time-inconsistent in the sense that once such premia are paid, bank equityholders have no incentive to reduce the risk profile of their assets. To maximize the value of equity under limited liability, they will continue to hold the portfolio of risky assets that maximizes their expected upside benefits. In other words, the choice of bank assets may be completely divorced from the premia level.
Furthermore, recent research has shown how deposit insurance is largely underpriced in most countries, in the sense that banks seldom pay a fair premium in exchange for the insurance they get.
32 This is consistent with our finding that deposit insurance premia are often so low that their effectiveness as entry hurdles constraining banks' risk-taking incentives might be seriously compromised.
32. Laeven (2002) .
The paper lends itself to a number of natural extensions. For example, deposit insurance is but one aspect of the incentives produced by the regulatory environment. Another important regulatory feature that might affect incentives is capital regulation. Our theory suggests that since banks have different investment opportunity sets, a one-size-fits-all approach to capital regulation is likely to be inappropriate. More research is, therefore, needed, especially using bank level data, to analyze the adequacy of capital ratios around the world and their impact on banks' riskshifting incentives. The results would have implications for the current debate on the reform of the Basle Accord.
Finally, we focus on bank-based indicators as a proxy for overall financial sector development and performance. Although banks play a key role in the financial system of most of the countries in our sample, the increasing importance of capital markets as well as of non-bank financial institutions (and the growing attention they receive in the literature) suggests that it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis of this paper to a broader range of agents and mechanisms which constitute the financial system. 
